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Welcome 




U.S. Navy Officers’ Attitudes on 
the Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” (DADT)  
LT Ryan Appleman 
LTJG Pete McLaughlin 
 
Advisors: Professor Mark Eitelberg  
         Professor Frank Barrett 
2 
Background 
• Continuation of 5 previous NPS studies: 
– 1993, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2010 
 
• Literature Review: 
– RAND Corporation reports, 1993 & 2010 
– Comprehensive Review Working Group 
report, Nov 2010 
– Palm Center report, Sept 2012 
– Psychological and sociological models of 
acceptance 
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 How have Navy officers’ attitudes on gays in 
the military changed: 
- since 1993? 
- since the repeal of DADT? 
 
What are Navy officers’ impressions 





• Qualitative study:  
• 59-question survey administered over a two-
week period 
• Four focus-group interview sessions 
 Survey 
Requests 





573 334 24 358 62.5% 
Total Collected Requested 
Focus Group 
Participants 
Respondents 358 573 19 
Completely 
Filled Out 
Surveys 334 334 























n=48 n=51 n=10 n=29 





























n=4 n=8 n=206 n=314 
Other 
7.6% 15.9% Distance 
Learning 
31.6% 43.6% 







   Data Analyzed Utilizing Four Methods: 
 
1. Navy (NPS Survey) vs. Society (Gallup Polls) 
 
2.  Trend Analysis of Navy over Time 
 
3. Demographic Breakdown 
 
4. Focus-Group Analysis 
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Results 
Navy officers vs. Society: Homosexuals in the 
Military 
Question 16. Gays and Lesbians should be allowed to serve openly in our 
military. (2010-2012) [Homosexuals should not be restricted from serving 
anywhere in the Navy (1994-2004)] (Percent who Strongly Agree or Agree) 
Do you think Homosexuals should or should not be hired for each of the 
following occupations…The Armed Forces? (Percent who agree they should 
be allowed) 
Year Navy Society 
1992/1994 24.6% 57% 
1996 35.8% 65% 
1999 39.2% 70% 
2004 49.7% 80% 
2010 59.8% 76% 
2012 73.4% N/A 8 
Navy officers vs. Society: Same-Sex Marriage and 
Benefits 
Question 44. Same-sex spouses of homosexual service members should be 
entitled to the same benefits provided to the spouses of heterosexual service 
members? (2012) [If homosexuals were allowed to serve openly, their 
dependents should be entitled the same benefits provided to dependents of 
heterosexuals? (2004-2010)] (Percent who Strongly Agree or Agree)  
Do you think there should or should not be health insurance and other 
employee benefits for gay and lesbian domestic partners or spouses? (Percent 
who believe there should be) 
Year Navy Society 
2004 69.2% N/A 
2009/2010 76.5% 67% 
2012 70.2% 77% 
Results (cont’d) 
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18. The current policy is good for 
national defense. 
 
33. On the whole, I like the current 




Trend Analysis of Navy Officer Attitudes:  
Leadership 
7. I would have no difficulty working for 
a homosexual Commanding Officer. 
 
21. A division officer’s sexual 
preference has no effect on the 








































Trend Analysis of Navy Officer Attitudes:  
Comfort and Habitability 
3. I would prefer not to have 
homosexuals in my command. 
 
20. I feel uncomfortable in the 
presence of homosexuals and have 





































Trend Analysis by Demographic Group: Pay Grade 
Results (cont’d) 
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• Major Themes from Focus Groups 
– Nothing changed 
– No adverse effect of repeal on unit cohesion, 
morale, readiness 
– Leadership and professionalism matter 
– Equal benefits for equal service 
Results (cont’d) 
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• Views have shifted dramatically since 1994 from 
strongly negative to strongly positive toward 
repeal of DADT and homosexuals serving 
openly in the military 
 
 
Data Analysis: Conclusions 
15 
Data Analysis: Conclusions 
• A vast majority of Navy officers say they have no 
difficulty serving with homosexuals, even though 
a number claim to feel uncomfortable sharing 




Data Analysis: Conclusions 
• Higher-ranking officers and officers with 16-20 





• Further analysis into reasons behind 16-
20 YOS group acceptance level 
 
• Continue to monitor post-repeal effects on 






NAVY ENLISTED RECRUITING: 
ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING 
RECRUITER PRODUCTIVITY 
LCDR Todd C. Winn 
 
Advisors: Professor Jeremy Arkes 




• Efficient management of the Navy’s enlisted 
recruiter force has become increasingly 
important. 
– 1980s Production per Recruiter (PPR) 2.4 
– 1990s average PPR 1.3 
– 2000s average PPR 0.86 
 
• New strategies needed in an effort to improve 
recruiter productivity 






  Can NRC increase recruiter productivity by 
altering the on-boarding process from eight 






• Interviews conducted over the past 7 months 
– Navy Recruiting Orientation Unit (NORU) instructors-5 
– LPOs (formerly called RINCS)-26 
– LCPOs (formerly called Zone Supervisors)-12 
– CRs-2 
• Policy Analysis-comparing current on-
boarding timeline vs. alternative  





The Inverted U 
 
   
Inverted U Enlisted Recruiter Production Curve 
FY94-FY02 Average New Contracts 


















0 months 3.75 5.25 8.25 1.25 2.25 
NRD  
Advance PQS (4.5 months) 
















0 months 3.75 6.25 1.0 2.25 
NRD  
Advance PQS (4 months) 
Alternative On-Board Process 
Cost Comparison 
Differences in cost 
• PCS cost is approx. $12,000 per recruiter 
based on TEMDUINS orders followed by 
PCS orders  
• 2010-Avg Navy PCS cost $4,500 
• TEMDUINS cost $7500 (travel, per diem, 
lodging) 
 
• Under the proposed system, the additional 
TAD cost per potential recruiter should be 






           Funding 
• NPC writes PCS orders to NRD, NRD writes 
(not funds) TAD orders to NORU 
• NRDs do not have the funding to send recruiters 
TAD to NORU 
• Cost for TAD orders $8,100  
 
• Alternative funding 
• Reallocation of funds from NPC to NRD 
• Funding code assigned that would not come out 
of NRDs budget 
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Costs/Benefits of Alternative On-
Boarding Process 
•Cost of new approach ≈ $600/recruiter 
•1000 new recruiters/year   total cost ≈ $1.8M/year 
•Benefit will be reduced recruiters needed if 
recruiters sign more contracts in tour 
•Depends on: 
•# recruiters 
•Productivity per recruiter 
•Increased # contracts per tour 
 
•Increased # contracts per tour is unknown: 
•More from shortening the on-boarding process 
•Less from sending TAD to NORU  
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Back-of-envelope initial estimates 
 
Results of sending a recruiter TAD to NORU and the additional productivity needed 
to break even. 
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Recommendations 
Conduct a Randomized Experiment: 
• Proposed design: 
• Treatment group - 600 enlisted sailors receive PCS 
orders to their NRD, complete basic PQS, then report to 
NORU 
• Control group – All recruiters who are not in the treatment 
group and are randomly selected  
• Recommended length of study is 3 years with intermittent 
results after every year 
• Reallocation of funds from NPC to NRC = $4.86 million 
• Analysis of data to determine results: 
• Compare and contrast productivity between the two 
groups 







Retention Elasticity and 
Projection Model For U.S. 
Medical Corps Officers 
CDR Abdullah AlShehri, RSNF 
LCDR Hyrum Brossard, MSC, USN 
 
Advisors: Professor Dina Shatnawi 
                   Professor Yu-Chu Shen 
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Background 
• Medical Corps Mission Statement:  “We 
enable readiness, wellness, and healthcare to 
Sailors, Marines, their families, and all others 
entrusted to us worldwide be it on land or at 
sea.” 
• Environment has Changed 
– GWOT 
– Economic Recession 
• Replicate a previous study that was conducted by 
CNA in 2002 using data from FY02 through FY11  





1. How does a change in the civilian-military medical 
providers pay gap affect the retention of Navy medical 
specialists? 
2. What are the projected retention rates for Navy medical 
providers, and how would adjusting special pay 
incentives influence their retention? 
 
Secondary:  
1. Has the prolonged GWOT and recent economic 
downturn influenced the Navy Medical Corps retention 





• Multivariate probit model 
– Dependent Variable:   
• Whether a person stays or leaves the Navy after their initial obligation 
– Explanatory Variables: 
• Variable of Interest 
– Civilian-Military Pay Gap 
• Demographics 
– Gender, race, age 
• Military Experience 
– Years of Service, Rank, Accession Source 
• Years/Specialty Dummy Variable 
• Forecasting Methods: 







Data Source  
•  Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) 
• BUMIS data (FY02 through FY11) 
 
•Special Pay 
• Incentive Special Pay (ISP) 
• Multi-year Special Pay (MSP) 
 
•DFAS 
• Database for Base Pay, BAH, & BAS 
 
•Medical Group Management (MGMA) 
• Civilian Physician Compensation Data  
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Preliminary Data Analysis 
Table 1.  Number of unobligated providers at a decision point to leave the Navy 
Fiscal Year 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
N= 634 642 726 633 534 475 377 331 324 284 4,960 
Stayers= 453 484 563 449 329 303 207 200 174 164 3,326 
 
Figure 1.  MC Retention Rate vs. Civilian-Military Pay Gap 
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Description of Demographics 























Main Model Primary Care Surgical Specialties Other Specialties
% Change of Probability of staying in the Navy if Civilian-
Military pay gap is reduced by $10,000 
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Results (cont’d) 
USUHS= Uniformed Service University of the Health Sciences 
AFHPSP Deferred= Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program 








USUHS AFHPSP Deferred FAP
Probability of Retention in The Navy 





    
Family Practice –0.37 
Internal Medicine –0.51 
Pediatrics –0.19 
Occupational Medicine –0.06* 
General Surgery –0.76 
Neurological Surgery N/A 



















• The effect of GWOT:  
• The retention probability decreased by 14.1 percentage points after 
FY05 compared to FY02-FY04 
 
• Probability of leaving the Navy is 23 percentage 
points higher for African Americans compared 
to their White counterparts 




• Military Tax Advantage showed no significant 
change on retention 
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Recommendations 
1. The Navy should increase or shift its funding in 
support of the USUHS program. 
 
2. Increase the MSP amount & offer the MSP 
earlier to LT’s and LCDR’s before their initial 
obligation of service is over (Regardless of 
Specialty). 
 
3. Increase MSP amount to primary care and 






Evaluating the Tailored Adaptive 
Personality Assessment System 
(TAPAS) on Navy Recruits 
LT Jessica Fahrman, USN 
 
Advisors: Professor Steve Mehay 
  Professor Elda Pema 
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Background 
• Civilian studies have documented the 
effect of non-cognitive attributes on 
• Job performance  
• Schooling decision 
• Army has used TAPAS to assess the 
“whole-person”   
– Effect of TAPAS scores on attrition 
• Within Navy, attrition rates vary within 
education/AFQT categories 
– TAPAS may help to better categorize recruits 
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1. Does TAPAS bring in new information? 
–  Evaluate the correlation of TAPAS with 
observables (demographics, ASVAB, AFQT, 
education). 
 
2. Do TAPAS scores predict whether an 
applicant will enlist?  
– Estimate the probability that an applicant enlists, 
controlling for TAPAS and all other observable 
background characteristics.  
 
Research Questions  
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•TAPAS is a computer adaptive test designed 
to capture personality characteristics. 
– 15 total measured personality facets  
– 5 broad categories (extraversion, conscientious, 
agreeableness, emotional stability, openness to 
experience) 
– 2 composites     
• “can-do”  – designed to predict job knowledge 
and training graduation 
• “will-do” – designed to predict motivation, 




• TAPAS administered to Navy recruits at 
MEPS from April 2011 to March 2013 
1.Measure correlations of TAPAS scores 
with select demographics and cognitive 
test scores 
 
2.Estimate a probit model for probability to 





Composite scores by Race 
•TAPAS composite scores among races compared to 
Caucasians  
 
   
Standard Deviation : 
  Will Do: 17.432 
 Can Do: 17.271 
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TAPAS scores by Race 
•TAPAS Traits with strongest correlation among 
races  
 
   
Asian Black Hawiian Hispanic Std Dev
achievement -0.179*** -0.0758*** -0.0718 -0.0238 0.507
adjustment -0.0823*** 0.0191 -0.0493 0.0112 0.526
dominance -0.177*** 0.00962 -0.129** 0.0455*** 0.553
inteleff -0.148*** 0.0906*** -0.117** 0.0179 0.572
nondelinquency -0.121*** -0.0410** -0.0912* -0.0446*** 0.497
physical -0.129*** -0.118*** -0.00891 -0.0327* 0.597
selfcontrol -0.0327 0.0761*** -0.0390 -0.0175 0.545
sociability -0.0755*** -0.0666*** -0.0887 -0.0277 0.565
tolerance 0.110*** 0.0677*** 0.163*** 0.112*** 0.531
****Control variables: gender, age, marital status, number of dependents, 
waiver, education, AFQT, and ASVAB subtests.                                                   
Base group: Caucasians 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10                                            n=11,042
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Composite scores by Education 
•TAPAS composite score correlation among 
education levels compared to HSDGs. 
 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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TAPAS scores by Education 
•TAPAS Traits with strongest correlation among 
education levels  
 
  
NHSD College Std Dev
achievement -0.0634* 0.0397** 0.507
cooperation -0.0720** 0.00689 0.454
dominance -0.119*** 0.0208 0.553
eventemper 0.0265 -0.0322** 0.456
inteleff -0.0268 -0.0468** 0.572
nondelinquency -0.0614* -0.0339* 0.497
physical -0.0937** 0.116*** 0.597
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10               n=11,042
****Control variables: race, gender, age, marital 
status, number of dependents, waiver, AFQT, and 




Non-Cognitive vs Cognitive 
•TAPAS Traits with strongest correlation among 





Probability to Enlist 
•The likelihood an applicant enlists based on 
composite scores  
  
Probit controlling for 
cognitive tests
Probit without controlling 
for cognitive tests
Coefficient 0.00262*** 0.00168**
Std error (0.000818) (0.000795)
Partial effect [0.00103]*** [0.000660]**
Coefficient 0.000445 0.00332***
Std error (0.000758) (0.000733)
Partial effect [0.000175] [0.00131]***
Can-do
Will-do
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
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Results 
• TAPAS scores vary significantly by 
– Race 
– Education level 
• Minimal to no correlation between cognitive 
and non-cognitive test scores 
– It appears that TAPAS is picking up new 
information about  a recruit 
• TAPAS composites significantly predict 
the probability of an applicant to enlist 
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Future Work  
• As the cohorts age evaluate TAPAS’s 
predictive effect on Navy attrition 
 
1. DEP attrition 
2. Boot camp attrition 







Estimation for UCLASS 
Squadrons 
CDR Gary Lazzaro 
 
Advisors: Professor Bill Hatch  
  Professor Cary Simon 
UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System 
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Background 
• Largest cost of any new system is manpower 
– Up to 70% of total system cost 
 
• Most research is performed on technical 
aspects of UCLASS aircraft 
–  Scant research in manpower requirements 
– “Autonomy” may reduce manpower  
UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System 
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• Primary:  
– What are the manpower requirements for a 
deployable UCLASS squadron?  
 
 
• Secondary:  
– How will UCLASS manpower requirements 
compare to F/A-18F manned squadrons? 
Research Questions  
UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System 
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Methodology 
• Determine squadron manpower requirements 
– Squadron support departments 
– UCLASS aircraft maintenance  
– UCLASS aircraft operators 
– Deployable squadron vs. deployable detachment 
 
 
• Assumptions must be made for some 
UCLASS squadron parameters 




   • Squadron manpower requirements may be 
grouped into four common areas 
– Some requirements depend upon number of 
aircraft, and others depend upon unit configuration. 
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• Data from squadron manpower documents  
– Analyzed VFA, VAW, VRC, VP & HSL units 
– Identified common manpower requirements 
 
 
• Theoretical analysis to determine UCLASS 
aircraft operators requirements 
– Autonomy vs. ethics 




UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System 
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Results of Data 
• Fully deployable squadron estimate: 
UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System 
• Detachment concept squadron estimate: 
Manpower comparison Officers Enlisted Total Difference
Completely deployable 
UCLASS squadron
36 161 197 86
One F/A-18F squadron 44 239 283 --
Manpower comparison Officers Enlisted Total Difference
UCLASS shore component 
with five detachments
103 540 643 772
Five F/A-18F squadrons 220 1195 1415 --
66 
Data Analysis: Results 
• Total annual manpower costs (FY13 $): 
– UCLASS shore component    
 with five detachments:  $60M 
– Five UCLASS squadrons: $89M 
– Five F/A-18F squadrons: $119M 
 
• Manpower costs compared to five F/A-18F 
squadrons: 
– UCLASS shore component    
 with five detachments:  $62M less 
– Five UCLASS squadrons: $30M less 
 UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System 
67 
Recommendations 
• Manpower planners should consider the 
detachment concept configuration for a 
future UCLASS squadron 
 
• Research assumptions will need to be 
revisited as the UCLASS program 
matures 
 
• UCLASS aircraft operator requirements 
should be allowed to vary during a 
mission 
UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System 
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Questions? 
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Thank You! 
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